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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RISK
MANAGEMENT EARLY WARNING
SYSTEMS
ORLEY H. LINDGREN,* RONALD CHRISTENSEN** AND DON HARPER MILLS***
I
INTRODUCTION
This article provides evidence that prompt incident reporting by medical
professionals can serve a useful "early warning" function to identify future
medical malpractice claims. Unlike traditional incident reports that focus on
largely minor injuries caused by non-physician employees of medical facilities,
the reporting system described in this article was designed to capture
significant medical injuries before claimants' lawyers do so. Physicians helped
to design this new system, which encourages prompt reporting-especially by
telephone or face to face with risk managers, not merely through the
conventional, standard written forms.
This article is part of a larger study of early warning, which explores how
early warning is used and how it can be improved.I The main goal of the
study was to confirm or deny the operative philosophy that early warning
based on incident reports or occurrence reports could improve claims
processing and outcomes. The data discussed here show that malpractice
claims established on the basis of early warning incident reports not only
involve the full range of injury severity, but also identify claims warranting
substantial indemnity payments. These claims are generally brought to the
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attention of claims personnel sooner than claims first opened upon receipt of
some type of legal notice. They are also closed more quickly, apparently due
to the greater availability of better information on the claims. Qualitatively,
risk managers believe the claims are more correctly handled. Compensation
payments are comparable, while the expenses of negotiating or litigating the
claims are substantially less.
The malpractice liability system is often attacked for its high costs and
unduly haphazard outcomes. Based upon the work described here, many of
its flaws can be ameliorated by improved claims reporting systems and claims
management. Working "within the system" in this manner deserves a place
on the reform agenda, alongside longer-term, more radical changes.
Moreover, in the long term, good risk management reinforces the purposes of
the medical facilities' quality assurance programs.
II
THE "EARLY WARNING" STUDY
A. Traditional Incident Reports and Their Limitations
Incident reporting systems exist in virtually all U.S. hospitals. 2 Many of
these traditional systems originated in the 1950s, as hospitals and their
outside liability insurers became more litigation conscious. These reports
were created as administrative reporting systems, during an era when
hospitals were responsible only for their own employees, not for
"independent contractors" such as physicians. As such, the reports typically
identify mishaps involving patients or visitors that were the result of non-
physician employee actions or hospital physical plant problems. 3 The reports
usually provide a written description of the patient injury or mishap, compiled
on a standard check-list, small-print form by nurses or other hospital
employees rather than by physicians. 4
Malpractice insurers are aware of these reporting systems and have made
limited, educational use of summary information from them. Nursing staffs
have also used the information, primarily to identify systematic risks within
the hospital physical plant or nursing procedures needing correction.
Nursing staffs also find the information helpful in developing educational
programs for hospital employees. 5
2. See generally US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Quality of M1edical Care:
Information for Consumers 101 (Gov't Printing Office, June 1988) (OTA-H-386) (see especially chapter
on "Adverse Events"); see also US Congress, US Gen Acct'g Office, Initiatives in Hospital Risk
Management (Gov't Printing Office, July 1989) (GAO/HRD-89-79).
3. The predominant "incidents" are patient or visitor slips and falls, lost patient property, and
medication errors. There is evidence that incident reporting systems do better in identifying claims
related to hospitals' custodial functions (for example, in patient rooms) than in medical service areas
(for example, emergency rooms). See Grace Duran, Positive Use ol Incident Reports. 53 Hospitals 60-68
(1979).
4. See, for example, James E. Orlikoff, William R. Fifer & Hugh P. Greeley, 1Malpractice
Prevention and Liability Control for Hospitals (Am Hosp Ass'n, 1st ed 1981).
5. In particular, Jack Fulton of the Truck Insurance Exchange in California did pioneering, if
unpublished, work on the uses of incident reports in hospitals. See Don Harper Mills & Orley H.
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These traditional incident reports have been of limited value, however, for
insurance claims personnel and risk managers in identifying potential
malpractice claims. Traditional reports often define the incidents unclearly
and sometimes confuse which incidents should be reported. As a result,
hospital reporting patterns vary widely, and completed reports often lack
information about the nature and extent of the reported injuries. 6 Indeed,
most traditional incident reports describe errors that were corrected or
otherwise had no consequential impact on patient care. Moreover, the
reports rarely derive from medical and surgical care-the very occurrences
most likely to result in liability and large damages awards. Also, those most
involved in delivering such care-physicians-are rarely involved in'
submitting or screening incident reports under traditional practice. 7 Because
physicians seldom participate and because many fear subsequent discovery of
the information through the legal process, more serious occurrences typically
go unreported.8 Moreover, incident reports are not very selective; literally
thousands are filed, very few of which relate to valid claims. Thus, traditional
incident reports are neither very specific nor very sensitive as screening tools.
They produce a great many "false positives" (reporting cases that do not
become claims) as well as "false negatives" (failing to report incidents that
become actual claims).
None of this is good news for claims or risk managers. Hence, instead of
laboriously sifting through the incident reports, claims personnel traditionally
have not opened files and begun resolving claims until they received legal
notice, such as a formal letter of intent to sue or some other type of legal
notice of an impending or pending law suit. 9
Lindgren, The Impact of Liability Litigation on the Quality of Care, in James Couch, ed, Health Care Quality
Management for the Twenty-First Century (Am Coil Physician Executives, Summer 1991); Don Harper
Mills, Orley H. Lindgren, & Diane Brown, Malpractice Risk Management, in Gary Gitnick, ed, The
Business of Medicine: A Physician's Guide (Elsevier Science, forthcoming 1991).
6. Orlikoff, Fifer & Greeley, Malpractice Prevention and Liability Control for Hospitals at 34-35 (cited
in note 4); James E. Orlikoff & Audrey M. Vanagunas, Malpractice Prevention and Liability Control for
Hospitals 55-57 (Am Hosp Ass'n, 2d ed 1988).
7. Physician-owned insurance companies typically maintain separate incident reporting
systems. These insurers first appeared in the mid-1970s and rapidly grew to provide a significant
portion of physician liability coverage, unrelated to coverage of the hospitals within which the
physicians practice. See Frank A. Sloan, Randall R. Bovbjerg & Penny Githens, Insuring Medical
Malpractice (Oxford U Press, 1991). Although there may be cooperation on individual cases, the basic
data on hospitals and their employees and on physicians are maintained in separate databases.
8. See generally Orlikoff & Vanagunas, Malpractice Prevention and Liability Control for Hospitals at
55-57 (cited in note 6) ("Although these occurrences justify identification they are of little use in
pinpointing patient injuries or areas of risk that may generate a claim or litigation and result in large
financial losses for hospitals."). It is also notable that nurses in a typical U.S. community hospital,
who take medical orders from independent attending physicians, cannot as readily report on those
physicians as on their nursing peers or other matters directly affecting their hospitals.
9. Estimates vary as to what percentage of malpractice actions begin with an incident report.
Some publications indicate that the percentage ranges from 5% to 30%, though these publications
are often unclear as to what kinds of reporting are involved and whether all claims from a given type
of care are counted. See. for example. American College of Surgeons/Bader & Associates, Inc.,
Patient Safety Manul: .4 Guide fo Hospitals and Physicians to a Systematic .lpproach to Quality A-ssuyance and
Risk Management 51-54, 70-72 (Am College of Surgeons, 2d ed 1985); Orlikoff. Fifer & Greeley,
Malpractice Prevention and Liability Control for Hospitals at 36-37 (cited in note 4); Am Hosp Ass'n,
Page 23: Spring 1991]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
B. Improving on Traditional Incident Reports
The need for improved detection of medical malpractice claims has long
been clear. A new approach for early detection taken in the 1970s was
"generic screening," which originated in the California Insurance Feasibility
Study.' 0 The basic idea of early detection is to review hospital records for
adverse outcomes caused by medical management. Because so many charts
had to be examined to find such relatively rare events, screening criteria were
developed by which non-physicians could identify suspect records. The
identified records were then reviewed by physicians to determine the presence
or absence of patient disabilities caused by health care management. Even
with screening criteria, this process proved very expensive to implement for
claims detection. Also, it was unfamiliar to hospitals and their staffs, requiring
extensive training and continuing education. I I
Another approach arose from the joint efforts of Los Angeles County 12
and the Professional Risk Management Group ("PRMG"). 13 Under this
approach, incidents are found, described, and preliminarily classified in a one-
stage reporting system. After classification, independent, professional claims
personnel determine which incidents merit investigation or intervention.
This approach is the basis for the system and the research described here.
C. Risk-Management Philosophy in Pro-Active Liability Claims
Management
The basic philosophy of risk management is that medical care providers
should detect and immediately report misadventures and hospital-acquired
patient injuries with liability potential. 14 Then immediate investigation and,
Medical Malpractice Task Force Report on Tort Reform and Compendium of Professional Liability Early Warning
Systems for Health Care Providers 1-4 (Am Hosp Ass'n, May 1986) ("Task Force Report"); US Gen Acct'g
Office, Initiatives in Hospital Risk Management 15-16, 23 (Gov't Printing Office, 1989) (GAO/HRD-89-
79).
10. See Don Harper Mills, David Rubsamen & John Boyden, Report on the Medical Insurance
Feasibility Study for the California Medical Association and California Hospital Association (Sutter, 1977). Don
Harper Mills and Jack Fulton (see note 5) developed a system called the Notification System for the
California Hospital Association in 1979 using the screening criteria developed in the California
Insurance Feasibility Study. Mills converted the screens into specific categories such as cardiac
arrest, hemorrhage, pulmonary embolus, and wound disruption. Mills has been affiliated with the
Professional Risk Management Group since 1987, serving as a consultant and as medical director.
11. Today occurrence reporting at the departmental level is recommended for quality review.
See Paul J. Sanazaro & Don Harper Mills, A Critique of the Use of Generic Screening in Quality Assessment.
265J Am Med Ass'n 1977 (April 17, 1991).
12. SeeJoyce SanJenko, Los Angeles County Risk Management Program (paper presented at the Am
Pub Health Ass'n conference, 1976) (available from the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Nat'l Tech
Information Service).
13. The PRMG was founded in 1975 by G. E. von Bolschwing and Sidney Golman as
Professional Risk Management, Inc. The firm was established at the direction of Lloyds of London
and other underwriters and brokers providing excess insurance coverage to large self-insured
programs for professional medical and hospital liability in California. By 1983. PRMG was
responsible for administering the medical malpractice self-insurance programs for all university
teaching hospitals in California except three; by 1987, PRMG was responsible for all but one.
14. Incidents were defined broadly to include any deviation from expected outcomes and any
hospital acquired patient injury. Within a few years this definition was being suggested for use by
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in selected cases, active intervention should be undertaken to assist the
patient, reduce liability potential, and extract information for purposes of
preventing future mishaps. This approach has been taken in California by the
PRMG and the major, self-insured California public and teaching institutions
to which it provides claims and risk management services.
The concept of "early warning" of malpractice claims, which is a
fundamental part of this philosophy, is that adverse events can and should be
contemporaneously detected and routinely reported. All medical facility
personnel, including physicians and nurses, should join in such reporting.
The fact that all the medical facility personnel in the California institutions
that now use this approach with the PRMG are employees or agents of the
institutions (and thus are covered under the institutions' self-insurance
programs) facilitates this joint responsibility. Physicians and other providers
are actively involved in the design and periodic upgrading of the early
warning system. Physicians in particular have become far more involved in
active reporting. Two keys to higher participation have been making the
process easier as well as less threatening. Frequent feedback from the PRMG
and its promise of better legal defense have also helped encourage
participation. Participating physicians are encouraged to report by telephone
or face to face with "account executives," who are selected in part for their
interpersonal skills. Both the written and oral reports are collected on
standard forms, which are then coded by PRMG staff and entered into a
dedicated computer system. (In California, the communications to the
account executives are protected under confidentiality statutes.) The account
executives are frequently on-site, in and around the medical facilities, to carry
out investigations, consult with in-house hospital risk managers and staff, and
provide various departmental training presentations. The account executives
also staff "24-hour hot-lines" to facilitate incident reporting.
The early warning systems trigger active claims and injury management.
The account executives work closely with each institution's own risk manager
to mitigate both the physical and legal damages in a case. Patients are
routinely informed of any problems with their care and are often provided
treatment. The relevant portions of their bills are often either deferred or
waived by the medical facility. Care providers are encouraged to maintain
close communication with the patient and his or her family. When this
communication breaks down, the account executive and/or the facility risk
manager may meet directly with the patient, family, and their legal
representatives, if any, in an attempt to identify and resolve the problems in a
non-litigious manner. Such interactions continue until the potential claim is
resolved.
Of course, claims initially handled informally sometimes result in the filing
of legal claims. Even then, however, the account executives stay actively
involved in, and in control of, the claims management process-although
physicians nationally. See Robert H. Brook & Kathleen N. Williams, Malpractice and the Quality of Care,
8 Annals of Internal Med 836 (1978).
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outside defense counsel is typically retained by PRMG to handle specific legal
motions and, as necessary, formal discovery or court proceedings.
Throughout, the main emphasis remains on informal cooperation and
accelerated investigation and claims resolution.
The information from the investigation and management of malpractice
claims and potential claims is used to prevent injury to subsequent patients
and to help motivate the medical staff to report future injuries. With
successful early warning, such information is available for feedback much
sooner than information from medical malpractice claims files that are
established more conventionally. When the early warning is first investigated,
and again later when the information is extracted from the files and fed back
through the medical facilities' committees and educational meetings, the
medical staffs are reassured that their reports were useful-that the reports
facilitated determining the facts, helping the injured patients, and controlling
the facilities' potential liability. The malpractice investigation and
management process also provide information that can help a medical
department make positive changes for patient care, such as replacing a piece
of worn (and dangerous) equipment or identifying and correcting problems of
coordination of care.
III
DATA AND METHODS
This article reports on the medical malpractice claims based on incident
reports and the risk management system employed in California for selected
self-insurance programs that serve public, high-risk teaching facilities. More
than thirty health care facilities are included: urban and suburban general
medical centers, high risk obstetric and pediatric hospitals, and a variety of
other outpatient, ambulatory, and public health clinics. Together, these
medical facilities employ several thousand physicians and tens of thousands of
other healthcare workers, all of whom are included under their institution's
liability coverage. As noted above, claims and risk management services are
provided to each of these facilities by the PRMG, which also contributed to
the databases used for this article.
These databases include nearly 50,000 reports (telephone and written)
and some 8,000 malpractice claims files. 15 Most of the analyses reported here
are based on the claims data, which included 6,706 (84 percent) closed claims
and 1,274 (16 percent) open claims from July 1, 1976 through June 30, 1989.
About 550 claims were set up each year, ranging from an annual low of 400
claims to a high of 700 claims. The number of claims generally increased
during the later years. During the entire period, 6,727 claims were closed.
Unless otherwise noted, analyses were performed using both open and closed
15. The exact number of incident reports and claims used in each of the analyses varies because
of the different degrees of completeness of the coded' information. For example, the year in which
the incident occurred was known for somewhat fewer than the full set of claims.
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claims. Analyses of claims' indemnity and expense payments naturally
included only closed claims.
Claims analyzed here were restricted to those involving liability that could
be characterized as "professional" or "medical." Other types of claims,
accounting for less than 3 percent of the original database, were excluded,
such as claims involving premises or general liability, workers' compensation,
wrongful termination, or auto accidents (in the hospital parking lot, for
example). A claim involving a single, directly injured party was counted as
one claim regardless of the number of total claimants or the number or type
of defendants. Thus, a claim filed by a mother and father, each alleging
damages on behalf of their newborn baby, which was brought against the
hospital, several doctors, and the nurse and technician, is counted as one
claim.
The mode of first notice of a claim was characterized as either "incident
report" or "legal notice." Incident reports have already been described.
Legal notice includes a letter or other written notice of intent to file a claim, a
verified complaint, or the filing of or service of process for a lawsuit.1 6
Before beginning the study, the accuracy of the mode-of-notice computer
coding was tested by an independent, retrospective computer matching of
incident reports and claims, and by verification with information contained in
the manual claims files. All claims data were also subjected to data quality
analysis, and any questionable values were confirmed or corrected based on
multiple documents in the manual files. Statistical presentations are
straightforward univariate presentations of data points or cross tabulations in
contingency tables, with chi-square significance testing.' 7
IV
PERFORMANCE OF THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
A. Early Warning and the Speed of Claims Resolution
1. Early Warning Is Indeed Early. Both the written and telephone incident
reports do provide early warning of claims. More than 90 percent of both
forms of the reports are made within one week of the adverse event. Fully 95
percent are generated within 30 days. In contrast, under one percent of legal
notices arrive within one month of the incident; the majority arrive more than
a year after the incident.' 8
16. Initially we categorized the mode of first notice as an external or internal notice. The
external notice was almost exclusively legal notice. Other possibilities, not observed, included
notification from government agencies. The internal notice came almost exclusively from incident
reports-either a telephone incident report or a written incident report. Other possibilities, rarely
observed, included occurrence screens and similar screening mechanisms.
17. Most of the chi-square results were significant at greater than the p =.001 level, indicating
that the pattern of results in the Tables shown were highly unlikely to be due to chance. Detailed
statistical results may be obtained from the authors.
18. These data, not presented in tabular form, come directly from the databases described
above. Details are available from the authors.
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just under 600 incident reports were telephoned per year, that is, fewer
than six per hospital per month for the entire thirty-facility system monitored
here. In contrast, approximately 15,000 reports were written annually,
averaging as many as 400 per month for the large (750 bed) hospitals.
Significantly, the "yield" of claims was higher from telephone reporting.
Nearly 30 percent of telephoned reports "triggered" the establishment of a
claim file, accounting for fully 32 percent of the total claims established from
all forms of notice, whereas less than one percent of written incident reports
prompted claims files. 19 Still, because of their high volume, written incident
reports generated about 10 percent of all claims files. In total, incident
reports identified approximately 42 percent of claims opened during the
fourteen years covered in this article.20
2. Early Warning Does Speed Resolution. The speed of incident reporting is
only one step in the overall process of resolving medical injury claims. After
the telephoned or written report is received, the responsible account
executive must investigate the incident and decide whether it is serious
enough to warrant creating a malpractice claim file. If so, the executive
decides what financial reserve is appropriate and what plan of action is called
for to defend or settle the matter. Further time elapses during investigation
and settlement negotiations. Other things equal, shorter is better for all
concerned. The traditional length of the malpractice settlement process
causes emotional stress, takes the parties' away from more productive
pursuits, and costs attorneys and insurers money in terms of personnel time
as well as lost investment earnings from holding claims reserves in ultra-
secure (and lower yielding) accounts. Our data show that the early warning of
incident reports speeds claims processing and resolution, and, presumably,
will mitigate many of the negative aspects associated with the traditional
protracted resolution of medical malpractice claims.
19. These data, not presented in tabular form, are from 1984-85, a period for which more
detailed data management systems were in place. Details are available from the authors.
20. Early warning claims, even though they involve first notice by incident reports, sometimes
may not arrive very much before subsequent legal notice of the same claim. Although we cannot
accurately track the extent to which incident reports subsequently "go legal" under the various
circumstances of interest, we estimate that, during a recent period of more intensive claims tracking,
at least 17% of the telephone reported claims and 11% of the written reported claims have "gone
legal." Our next studies will investigate the reliability and validity of this tracking and the reasons
that early warning may "go legal" and to what effect. Not all cases of incident reports that later
involve claimant lawyers truly have gone legal. For example, with "birth injury claims" or other
claims involving minors, account executives often encourage families to seek legal counsel to protect
the best interests of the children.
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TABLE 121
TIME FROM INCIDENT TO CLAIM SET-UP BY MODE OF NOTICE
Months to Set-up Percentage Set-Up by Year After Incident
mean median 1st year 2d year 3d year 4th year 5th year 6th year
Telephone IR 7.0 6.5 91.7 6.9 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1
(n=2368)
Written IR 8.2 7.3 88.1 9.2 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.4
(n=981)
Legal Notice 14.3 10.3 59.5 30.3 4.3 2.0 1.1 2.8
(n=4610)
Table 1 shows that account executives are able to establish a claims file more
quickly from an incident report than from legal notices of claims. The
average time elapsed is only 7.0 months for telephoned incident reports and
8.2 months for written reports, compared to 14.3 months for legal notice of
claims. In each case, the averages are longer than the medians, reflecting the
influence of a relatively small share of cases with very slow set-up. Our results
are not dissimilar from those reported by earlier studies of closed claims.
22
Table 1 also shows the pattern of time by year elapsed from incident: the
vast majority of incident-report claims (88 and 92 percent) were established in
the first year after incident; less than 1.5 percent remained to be opened after
three years. Conversely, only 60 percent of the legal cases opened within a
year, and about 6 percent had not yet opened at the end of three years.
2 3
21. There are slightly differing numbers of claims in Tables I through 3 because some claims
were still open at the time of data collection and because some claims lack a key date. (For Table 1,
total cases = 7,459; Table 2 = 6,728; and Table 3 = 6,706.) In some cases, the claims file was
formally set up at a date after the claim was closed (by settlement or other process). In these cases,
the time from claim set-up to claim closed was taken as zero. The result of this coding issue is that
the times from incident to set-up are somewhat overstated (Table 1), while those from set-up to
closure are understated (Table 2). For all tables, the figures have been rounded to the nearest tenth.
22. A national study of malpractice claims closed in 1975-78 found that just over half of all
claims were "reported," that is, files were opened, within a year of incident; 5% remained
unreported after four years. Nat'l Ass'n Ins Commissioners, 2 Malpractice Claims, Final Compilation:
Medical Malpractice Closed Claims 1975-1978, 24 Table 1.1 (Nat'l Ass'n of Insurance Commissioners,
1980) ("NAIC Census"). A similar nationwide survey for a sample of 1984 closed claims found that
just under half of all claims were filed within a year, and 6% were not filed by the end of three years.
The average time to filing was 16.4 months (median of 13 months). US Gen Acct'g Office, Medical
Malpractice: Characteristics of Claims Closed in 1984, 32 (April 1987) (GAO/HRD-87-55) ("GAO Survey").
In drawing comparisons across different claims data, one must always be mindful that insurers
and claims adjusters differ in how they define a "claim," that is, under what circumstances they open
a file and tabulate data. The GAO survey, for instance, omitted all claims for which no formal
demand for payment was made on behalf of a claimant. Id at 15. Also, the NAIC study predated the
wide development of the type of integrated hospital-physician medical centers reported on here, and
the GAO survey, based on insurance company data, did not include such self-insured entities. A final
source of difference between our results and those of NAIC or GAO is that we have largely urban,
high-risk, California hospitals-all factors predisposing toward high claims.
23. The NAIC census reported that 41.7% of claims were disposed of within one year of report,
and 13% remained to be disposed of after three years. NVAIC Census at 27 Table 1.2 (cited in note 22).
The GAO survey found that the median time from filing to closure was twenty-three months for
claims with payment and seventeen months for those without. Although the average times are not
presented, they should be somewhat longer. Just over one-third are resolved within one year, and
almost one-quarter take longer than three years. GAO Survey at 33 (cited in note 22). On the dangers
of cross-study comparisons, see note 22.
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The speed advantage enjoyed by incident-report claims continued to the
settlement stage. As Table 2 shows, incident-report claims were closed faster
than legal-notice claims.
TABLE 2
TIME FROM CLAIM SET-UP TO CLAIM CLOSURE BY MODE OF NOTICE
Months to Closure Percentage Closure by Year After Set-Up
mean median < 1 year 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5+ years
Telephone IR 9.3 3.1 76.4 10.0 7.2 2.5 2.1 1.8
(n = 2129)
Written IR 5.7 1.1 86.0 7.2 3.8 1.9 0.6 0.6
(n=913)
Legal Notice 17.8 10.6 53.0 16.7 13.5 9.2 4.0 3.8
(n = 3686)
The data show that set-up to closure time periods average well under a year
for incident-report claims (9.3 months for telephone reports, 5.7 months for
written reports). Legal-notice claims, on the other hand, stretch out to an
average of 17.8 months before resolution. For the median times, the
advantage is even more striking: the median incident report claim closes in
three months or less, whereas the median legal notice claim takes more than
ten months. The disparity between the means and medians shows that many
incident reports are closed quickly, which is consistent with their high rate of
closure without indemnity or expenses. In terms of time distribution, three
quarters or more of incident-report claims close in the first year after set-up
(76 to 86 percent), whereas barely half of legal-notice claims are resolved this
quickly (53 percent). Moreover, whereas only about 6 percent of incident-
report claims take more than three years to close, 17 percent of legal-notice
claims take this long.
Overall, claims prompted by incident reports average slightly more than a
year from incident to resolution, while legal-notice claims average more than
thirty-two months. The clear majority of early warning claims (some 60 or 70
percent) were resolved with less than a year's delay from patient injury to
payment or other closure. Less than 15 percent of legal-notice claims settle
that fast, and more than 10 percent of legal claims take more then five years to
settle, compared to 3 percent or less of incident-report claims. 24
3. Early Warning Claims Are Faster Despite Having More Severe Injuries. The
speed achieved by early warning cases is all the more remarkable because the
24. Again here, comparisons may be sought with the NAIC census and GAO survey. In the
1970s, overall time from incident to disposition averaged 41.3 months for all claims. However, more
severe claims took longer to resolve, and 1978 claims resolved faster than 1975 claims. NAIC Census
at 28-29 Table 1.3 (cited in note 22). The GAO did not report overall time to closure.
The speedier process observed for legal-notice claims in our study may in part reflect differences
in the number and amounts of paid claims. Compared with the GAO closed claims sample, the legal-
notice claims in our study had a smaller portion of claims closed with payment, a smaller proportion
of payments exceeding $100,000, and no claims with payments exceeding $1 million. Details are
provided in the next section of this paper.
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TABLE 3
TIME FROM INCIDENT TO CLAIM CLOSURE BY MODE OF NOTICE
Months to Closure Percentage Closure by Year After Incident
mean median < 1 year 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 + years
Telephone IR 15.6 8.8 60.5 20.5 8.5 5.0 2.4 3.2
(n=2 126)
Written IR 12.5 7.4 69.7 17.2 7.1 2.6 1.6 1.7
(n=912)
Legal Notice 32.1 24.0 15.0 35.2 17.8 11.7 9.3 11.1
(n = 3668)
incident reports, both written and telephoned, involved relatively more
serious injuries than the legal-notice claims. Moreover, severity of injury
positively correlates with time to resolution; claims for severe injuries take
longer to resolve than claims for minor injuries. For this analysis, we relied
on the more recent time periods in our data, for which better information was
readily available.
TABLE 4
RATING OF INJURY SEVERITY BY MODE OF NOTICE
Percentage Percentage Distribution by Category
of Total none* minor moderate severe
Telephone IR 21.0 0.5 19.3 41.7 38.5
(n= 187)
Written IR 7.5 0.0 31.3 37.3 31.3
(n=67)
Legal Notice 71.5 4.1 26.9 45.6 23.4
(n= 636)
* none = no ratable physical injury.
Simple ratings of severity of injury (from no ratable injury to severe) are
made on incident reports at the time they are created. From our sample of
1984-85 incident reports, the most notable finding is that telephone reports
are associated with more serious injuries. Of some 600 telephone reports, all
but one rated the injuries above "no ratable injury." In contrast, of some
15,000 written reports, nearly 90 percent reported severity of injury as
unknown or "no apparent effect," or left the answer blank. Of the 10.5
percent written reports showing some actual injury, 5.4 percent rated severity
of injury as "minor" and 5.1 percent rated it as "moderate to severe."
However, we do not know how consistent different medical personnel are in
arriving at their ratings.
Similar ratings are made in the claims files. Here the evaluations should
be more consistent because they are made by the much smaller number of
trained account executives. Severity of injury was defined for the account
executives as the extent to which an injury caused pain and suffering and
either was life threatening or required treatment to be corrected.
Permanence of injury was defined as the extent to which an injury, regardless
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of its severity, was likely or not to be correctable either spontaneously or
through treatment.
For the 1984-87 claims files (approximately 850 claims), early warning
claims involved "minor", "moderate" and "severe" patient injuries. The
results suggest that incident reports identify a substantial portion of claims
involving some degree of patient injury, including moderate and severe
injury. They also suggest that early warning claims have proportionately
fewer "nonratable" injuries and proportionately more "severe" injuries than
expected; the reverse is true for legal-notice claims. 2 5
B. Early Warning and Malpractice Payments
1. Incident-Report Claims Involve the Full Range of Payment Levels. Just as
incident-report claims involve injuries equally severe and permanent as legally
initiated claims, if not more so, they also involve high-cost along with low-cost
cases. The mean and median costs per claim are quite low when one considers
all claims, paid and unpaid.
TABLE 5*
TOTAL CLAIMS SPENDING
All Closed Claims (paid and unpaid)
minimum median mean maximum
Telephone IR $0 $0 $12.4 $913.0
Written IR 0 0 3.6 484.9
Legal Notice 0 0 13.0 903.6
Closed Claims With Some Indemnity Paid
minimum median mean maximum
Telephone IR $20 $31.1 $87.4 $913.0
Written IR 25 8.6 41.1 484.9
Legal Notice 10 16.8 60.0 903.6
* Dollar amounts expressed are thousands, and include indemnity plus expenses. Amounts are
nominal dollars in year paid.
The median for all modes of notice is zero (Table 5), because more than half
of all cases are closed without any payment to either the claimant or outside
attorneys or investigators for expenses of defense (Table 6). The observed
25. As noted above, the study also examined permanence of injury, which was rated as a
separate construct by the account executives. Only one-third of the claims were rated as involving
permanent injury, and the contingency table chi-square results were not statistically significant.
Thus, early warning claims were not found to be correlated with likelihood of permanent injury.
Severity and permanence of injury are constructs which have been interwoven in scales used in
previous studies of malpractice, such as those by the California Insurance Feasibility Study, the NAIC
census, and the GAO survey. Injuries can be categorized as ranging from minor to major
independently of the degree to which they are temporary or permanent. For example, a deep
laceration of the abdomen may be serious in that it requires major surgery and hospitalization and
entails significant costs-yet (if the injured individual is not a fashion model, for example) the
individual may have only temporary disability. Our results suggest that the two constructs should be
further examined to determine their convergent and discriminate validity, and possibly should be
measured separately in future itudies.
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means are all at or below $13,000 per case (Table 5). For claims with some
indemnity paid, the figures are naturally much higher. Interestingly,
telephone incident-report claims score above legal claims, which are
themselves higher than written-report claims. This pattern is consistent with
the levels of severity noted above (Table 2).
TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF CASES BY TOTAL COSTS AND MODE OF NOTICE
Percentage Percentage Distribution by Total Costs*
of Total $0 $1-9999 $10,000+ $50,000+ > $99,999
Telephone IR 31.7 78.4 10.3 2.4 3.5 31.7
(n=2 126)
Written IR 13.6 87.5 5.1 0.8 0.9 13.6
(n=9 12)
Legal Notice 54.7 53.2 30.5 2.3 3.4 54.7
(n = 3668)
* Includes all closed claims; total payments are not available on open claims. "Total costs" =
indemnity plus allocated loss expense.
TABLE 7
TOTAL COSTS BY MODE OF NOTICE FOR UNPAID AND PAID CLAIMS
Percentage Percentage Distribution
Unpaid versus Paid of Paid Claims
$0 >$0 $1-9999 $10,000+ $50,000+ >$99,999
Telephone IR 78.4 21.6 47.8 25.3 10.9 16.1
Written IR 87.5 12.5 64.9 21.9 6.2 7.0
Legal Notice 53.2 46.8 65.3 22.5 4.8 7.3
More than 75 percent of telephone-report claims and nearly 90 percent of
written-report claims have zero indemnity plus allocated expenses (Table 6).
One supposes that this pattern reflects some combination of factors. With
early risk management, the need to seek outside counsel, and thus incur
additional expense, may be less than where legal notice has already come
from outside. Alternatively, account executives may want to be "better safe
than sorry" and set up claims files in response to the potential exposure
represented by the report's assessment of the level of injury and the estimated
degree of liability, with less regard to the actual likelihood that a patient will
see an attorney and bring suit (which in any event is very hard to predict).
It is also notable that telephone-report claims seem to contain relatively
more cases in the higher ranges (more than $50,000)-almost 3.5 percent of
total cases (the same as for legal-notice claims)--even though less than half as
many telephone-report claims involve any cost at all (Table 6). The pattern is
clearer on Table 7 where the percentage distribution of cases includes only
the non-zero ones. For example, Table 7 examines the 22 percent of
telephone-report claims that cost any money then sets out how this subset of
claims is shared among cost categories. This array shows more directly that
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the non-zero telephone-report cases (the dominant mode of incident
reporting with dollar cost) are different from either the written-report ones or
the legal notice cases. That is, telephone-report claims are more costly than
legal-notice claims: Whereas two thirds of the legal mode cost between one
dollar and $10,000, less than half of the incident-report claims fall within that
category (Table 7). Similarly, although more than a quarter of telephone-
report claims cost more than $50,000 per case, less than half that fraction of
legal cases are so costly (12.1 percent) (Table 7). The higher relative cost of
these incident-report claims may reflect the higher severity of injury involved.
Additionally, the low relative cost of legally-initiated claims may reflect small
payments to outside counsel, associated to assist with the defense, or to
claimants with counsel as a sort of compromise payment. As with the other
findings noted above, further analysis is needed here to understand these data
more fully.
2. Allocated Expenses Are Relatively Low for Incident-Report Claims. A very
frequent complaint about the malpractice liability system is that it costs too
much in "overhead," that is, payments to lawyers, investigators, insurers, and
others who are not claimants.2 6 One goal of good claims management is to
reduce this consumption of resources that could be made available for better
uses, including possibly broadening health care services or increasing
compensation to injured parties.
The largest single dollar cost of medical liability is that of payments made
to claimants, including payments through out-of-court private settlements,
court-approved settlements, court judgments (typically on jury verdicts), or
arbitrators' awards. 27 Beyond these payments, costs of malpractice claims
include "allocated" costs of investigation and defense, or "allocated loss
expense" ("ALE"), which encompasses those costs properly attributable to
the management of particular claims. 28 Normally these costs are external to
the claims administrator or insurance company and are therefore readily
tracked. ALE includes costs of (1) copying medical records, (2) providing
laboratory and medical examination services for claims management (as
opposed to direct patient care), (3) transcribing records, (4) obtaining
medical experts and reimbursing witnesses, (5) compensating defense
26. See, for example, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Report of the Task Force on
Medical Liability and Malpractice 19 (HHS, August 1987) ("The present system is widely perceived as
expensive to operate. Estimates of the percentage of premiums actually paid out as compensation to
victims vary, but it is very likely less than half .... [A] compensation system for medical injury should
operate efficiently in terms of financial costs, professional energies, and governmental process.").
27. "Claim severity" is the average indemnity paid on claims, sometimes stated as paid-claims
severity, sometimes as a total average, including unpaid claims.
28. See, for example, Randall R. Bovbjerg, et aljuries andJstice: Are Malpractice and Other Personal
Injuries Created Equal, 54 L & Contemp Probs 5 (Winter 1991). "Unallocated" malpractice claims
costs are, as their name implies, the costs not readily attributable to an individual claim, including the
administrative overhead of the third-party administrator or insurance company. For rate-making
purposes, these costs are added as a proportionate percentage loading. For purposes of this study,
unallocated costs are excluded. They would be proportionate to the indemnity and allocated cost in
any case.
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counsel, and (6) paying court costs assigned to the defense. Of course,
claimants incur additional transaction costs as well (particularly attorneys' fees
if successful). Claimant expenses are often assumed to be proportionate to
defense expenses. In any event, data on them are not available to us.
The ratio of ALE to total cost (indemnity plus ALE) is a good measure of
the transaction cost of the liability system. Our data suggest that the early
warning system achieves low ratios of ALE to total cost.
TABLE 8
RATIO OF EXPENSES TO TOTAL CLAIMS COST BY MODE OF NOTICE
Total Total Cases Expense Ratio* by Indemnity Paid
All Cases w/Indemnity $0 $1-9999 $10,000+ $50,000+ >$99,999
Telephone IR 44.8 14.2 100 18.0 15.9 12.3 7.4
(n=2 126)
Written IR 41.9 14.1 100 14.7 17.1 11.9 5.2
(n=9 12)
Legal Notice 72.3 31.9 100 43.2 25.8 19.0 11.5
(n = 3668)
Total 100 36.8 22.0 16.3 9.6
(n=6706)
Ratio = allocated loss expense ("ALE")/(indemnity + ALE), as a percentage.
Overall, ALE of incident-report claims is less than 45 percent of total costs,
while ALE of legal-notice claims is more than 70 percent of total costs. This
finding was expected, as claims-management policy is to monitor and control
outside defense attorney costs and to require account executives to actively
control and settle all meritorious cases that can be settled at a reasonable
value.
The pattern of low ALE percentages holds true for each category of
payment amounts. Especially noteworthy are the claims in which less than
$10,000 was paid. At this low end of the payment scale, the difference
between incident-report claims and legal-notice claims is particularly
dramatic: legal-notice claims have an expense "burden" of 43.2 percent, as
compared to only 14.7 percent and 18 percent for written-report claims and
telephone-report claims, respectively. The expense percentage falls as total
costs rise. This pattern is consistent with a high fixed cost for hiring outside
counsel, a virtual necessity once a claimant's attorney is involved. Where
legal-notice claims are in the lower indemnity range, the ALE ratio is then
necessarily high. For all types of notice, ALE ratios decrease as indemnity
increases; this pattern is also consistent with high fixed costs of ALE,
especially for outside defense attorneys. The relative advantage of incident-
report claims is somewhat lower although still definitely present at the
extreme of high indemnity. It may be that both sides spend more heavily
when the stakes are clearly high. We expected savings in expense to be
greater for "high value" cases, where case management by the account
executives is particularly focused because of limits of staff time and a
recognition that these cases contribute a disproportionate share to the
program's overall expenses.
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ALE ratios for incident-report claims are relatively even lower when only
paid claims are counted, 14 percent compared to 32 percent for legal-notice
claims. Thig difference appears to reflect good management of settlement:
avoiding lawyers where possible, settling with less protracted litigation, and
otherwise holding down costs. Although ALE ratios for all incident-report
claims (paid and unpaid) are higher, this may be due to the claims' larger
share of zero-indemnity claims, many of which incur some allocated
expenses. 29
C. Early Warning and Litigation Outcomes
As might be expected in a program emphasizing settlement of meritorious
claims, well over 90 percent of the claims in our study were settled (with or
without payment of indemnity) before trial. A small fraction (less than 2
percent) settled during trial.30 From a risk management viewpoint, trial
results were quite successful: 84 percent were defense verdicts; 16 percent
were plaintiff verdicts (but only 6 percent were for more than the pre-trial
defense offers). 3 ' No verdicts exceeded one million dollars. The majority of
cases that are tried to verdict are high-value claims first reported by early
warning, particularly by telephone incident reports. These cases are tried
because, among other things, they are believed to be non-meritorious or a
mutually acceptable settlement value cannot be reached. They may be more
defensible, however, because early warning allows the collection of more
complete and accurate factual information while it is still fresh, and allows the
capture and retention of key pieces of evidence. Early warning also allows the
interviewing and tracking of key defense witnesses.
V
DISCUSSION: VARIATION IN REPORTING AND ACHIEVING IMPROVEMENTS
The summary statistics thus far presented do not show variations in
performance among sites, among medical specialties, or across time. Such
variations help point the way for how early warning systems can be improved.
The most basic performance relates to what percentage of subsequent claims
are first noticed through incident reports. While some reporting rates are
29. A zero-indemnity claim with ALE raises the ratio of ALE to indemnity plus ALE. The reason
is that these claims contribute less to the denominator than do claims with non-zero indemnity and
ALE.
These ratios for ALE are higher than for the claims in the GAO survey, although the percentage
for paid claims is similar for report-originated claims. GAO Survey at 20-21 (cited in note 22). From
its sample, GAO projected ALE of $807 million on some 73,000 total claims, with indemnities
totalling $2,566.4 million on almost 32,000 claims. The ALE ratio for all claims is thus 807/(2,566.4
+ 807) = 23.9%. ALE on paid claims was estimated at $458.1 million, so the ratio for closed claims
with payment was 458.1/(2,566.4 + 458.1) = 15.1%. Almost 83% of ALE was for defense counsel.
30. The GAO reports that 88.1% of overall claims were disposed of before trial (94.5% resolved
through conventional legal process), so the statistic comparable to ours is 93.2% settlement. See
GAO Survey at 37 (cited in note 22).
31. On the importance of considering trial outcomes in relation to relative bargaining positions,
see Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes. Imaging theJury's Shadow, 54 L & Contemp Probs
43 (Winter 1991).
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very high, others are quite low, which shows that there is considerable room
for improvement.3 2
The patterns are striking for what they seem to show about correlates of
high reporting rates. Facilities that specialized in acute care in obstetrics and
gynecology and in pediatrics reported 68 percent of their claims through early
warning, 46 percent of which were reported by telephone.33 Given the high
profile of obstetricians and "bad baby" cases in malpractice experience,
heightened use of the reporting system seems understandable. The results
for facilities with these specialties are encouraging, because these facilities
may constitute model programs for educating medical. staffs to participate
actively in both incident reporting and in feedback of information to
practitioners.
Similarly dramatic differences in the extent of the use of early warning
existed in nineteen groupings of medical specialties. For physicians as for
hospitals, not surprisingly, obstetrics, gynecology, and pediatrics were among
those specialties with the highest rate of claims identification (regardless of
the type of facility). Nearly half of their claims were identified through
telephone reports and more than 10 percent through written reports.
Highest of all physician specialties was anesthesia, with 73 percent of their
claims identified through early warning (59 percent by telephone). Among
occupations, nursing had the highest percentage of claims identified through
incident reports, 74 percent early warning, with 45 percent by telephone.3 4
The high extent of early warning in anesthesia and in obstetrics and
gynecology may be explained by the fact that these specialties have been the
focus of concentrated programs to educate medical staffs as to their high
malpractice liability exposure and to encourage the staffs' active participation
in the early warning reporting and investigation activities carried out by
hospital risk management and the PRMG.
Claims for 1978 through 1983 were predominantly reported first through
early warning (55 to 60 percent of claims, with 36 to 46 percent by telephone).
For 1984 to 1988, early warning was approximately 40 percent of claims
annually. The change in 1983 is understandable. That year marked a
retrenchment among California academic/public hospitals as they coped with
cutbacks in MediCal eligibility and rate cuts under California's competitively
negotiated payment contracts. Given significant staffing cuts and increases in
medically indigent patients requiring services, "extra" activities such as
incident reporting were reduced. One cutback imposed during this period
was on the financing of pro-active risk management activities, with the claims
administrator having to devote more time to managing high-value litigation
claims. Current demonstration-evaluation activities are underway to examine
32. The effectiveness of early warning is now being routinely tracked, so that future analyses will
not have to be retrospective, as is this one.
33. From a base of 1,269 such claims, we are statistically confident that these results are not due
simply to chance.
34. Similarly dramatic results were found for specialty groupings (including several of the
surgeries) whose claims were almost all established through legal notice rather than early warning.
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the extent to which the quantity and quality of early warning can be increased
to pre-1983 levels. 35 Claims administration is also being targeted. More
detailed examination of the quality of incident reports is called for, as well as
probing the claims administrator's structure and process of translating
incident reports into claim files.36
Quantitative data of the type this article has begun to develop not only
point to areas needing improvement, but they also suggest how much
improvement might be expected. For example, lesser-reporting groups can
be held to the standard of their higher-reporting peers. Moreover,
examination of recently tracked legal-notice claims suggests that both
reporting and reviewing incident reports could be improved. Retrospectively,
25 percent of the legal-notice claims were designated as having arisen from
incidents that "should have been reported but were not." Another 35 percent
actually had incident reports that should have been the basis for establishing
claims files but in fact were not. Thus, for the institutions and personnel
covered in this article's data, perhaps as many as 200 additional legal-notice
claims could have been identified annually through better early warning.
VI
CONCLUSION
Risk managers have long suggested that early identification of potential
liability claims through incident reporting could improve the prognosis of
injured parties, the performance of the liability system, and the well-being of
potential defendants. Many have also argued that faster and cheaper
resolution helps all parties and should be attainable.3 7 This article has offered
the first published empirical analyses to confirm this risk-management creed.
Several points about early warning deserve final emphasis. In design and
execution, the type of early warning described in this article, based on careful
use of incident reports, differs from traditional incident reporting in a number
of ways. Perhaps the key difference is the active cooperation of the full
hospital medical staff. Physician involvement is crucial for generating prompt
information about serious injuries, which disproportionately involve
physician-related care. A good claims- and risk-management staff is also
essential to this type of enhanced participation.
35. The goal is to improve both the process of creating reports and the process of reviewing and
making decisions to establish claim files on the basis of these reports.
36. These steps include: (1) increasing the frequency of in-service education programs for
medical staff, emphasizing the value and ease of incident reporting; (2) improving the various printed
charts, tables, and other reports that can be computer generated from the incident reports and
claims databases and routinely "fed back" to medical staff for motivational and educational purposes;
and (3) streamlining the process of coding, key entry, and review of incident reports.
37. Am Hosp Ass'n, Task Force Report at 4 (cited in note 9) ("In October 1985, the board of
directors of the American Society for Hospital Risk Managers of the American Hospital Association
voted to endorse the use of professional liability early warning systems as an essential component of
all comprehensive, hospitalwide risk management programs.").
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The rationale for promoting early warning is that "forewarned is
forearmed." As noted above, with the most dangerous exposure pin-pointed
early, claims management can (1) assemble relevant facts rapidly and
systematically while they are fresh; (2) identify and preserve relevant
documentary and material evidence; (3) take prompt action to define and
mitigate both patient injury and legal damages; (4) try to "make things right,"
perhaps with appropriate apologies, tender of remedial care, or waiver of
bills; and (5) generally attempt to forestall the emotional mind-set that seeks
vindication through formal legal proceedings. Finally, after ultimate
resolution of cases, pro-active management calls for tabulating results,
deriving lessons, and constantly re-educating clients and risk-management
professionals alike.
This article has presented preliminary descriptive results from over a
decade's expe,'ience with early-warning risk management in thirty institutions.
From this, it appears definite that incident reports, especially those
telephoned in, generate early warning in a large share of cases, although it
could be larger still. With a head start, the entire claims resolution process
moves more quickly than when it must await legal notice. Early warning also
lowers the "overhead" of claims resolution. Non-indemnity expenses are
lower in incident-report claims as a share of total cost than in legal-notice
claims. These beneficial results are achieved not just for the small incidents
traditionally reported, but also for a population of claims with more severe
injuries and even higher indemnities than found in legal-notice claims.
Further, legal outcomes are at least comparable to national norms in avoiding
trials and winning favorable verdicts.
Despite these favorable data, more needs to be learned. Information can
be improved about how early-warning risk management works and what
further steps can make it work more effectively. More basic and applied
research is needed on how information developed by risk managers can be
used to prevent patient injury.38 We also would benefit from documenting
the extent to which early warning works in other healthcare settings and in
other states. Although much work remains to be done to forge a strong
discipline and a successful relationship, for risk managers and their clients
alike, the future offers considerable promise for the still youthful profession
of risk management.
38. Thus far, there are conceptual as well as practical reasons to expect feedback to be effective
in helping medical professionals make appropriate changes, but practical implementation needs
constant effort.
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